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This paper examines how economic policy should respond to possible asset price bubbles. Three questions 
are considered:
￿ Are some asset price bubbles more problematic than others?
￿ How should monetary policy respond to asset price bubbles?
￿ What other types of policy responses are appropriate?
I conclude that asset price bubbles associated with credit booms present particular challenges because 
their bursting can lead to episodes of ﬁ  nancial instability that have damaging effects on the economy. 
Monetary policy should not react to asset price bubbles per se, but rather to changes in the outlook for 
inﬂ  ation and aggregate demand resulting from asset price movements. However, regulatory policies and 
supervisory practices should respond to possible asset price bubbles and help prevent feedback loops 
between asset price bubbles and credit provision, thereby minimising the damaging effects of bubbles on 
the economy.ARTICLES
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O
ver the centuries, economies have 
periodically been subject to asset price 
bubbles –pronounced increases in asset 
prices that depart from fundamental values and 
eventually crash resoundingly. Because economies 
often fare very poorly after a bubble bursts, central 
bankers need to think hard about how they should 
address such bubbles. This issue has become 
especially topical of late because of the rapid rise 
and subsequent decline in residential housing prices 
this decade. The recent drop in house prices in many 
markets around the world has been accompanied 
by increasing rates of defaults on mortgage loans 
and home foreclosures. These developments 
have  created hardship for the families who are 
forced to leave their homes and have disrupted 
communities; in addition, the developments have 
contributed to a major shock to the ﬁ  nancial system, 
with sharp increases in credit spreads and large losses 
to ﬁ  nancial institutions. As many have pointed out, 
the damage to households’ credit and the ﬁ  nancial 
disruption have been a drag on the US economy, 
which has led to a slowing of economic growth and 
a recent decline in employment.
In this paper, I would like to return to the issue of how 
we should respond to possible asset price bubbles. 
I will ﬁ  rst focus on the conceptual framework I use to 
evaluate these issues, based on a core set of scientiﬁ  c 
principles for monetary policy.1 My framing of the 
issues highlights the following three questions:
￿ Are some asset price bubbles more problematic 
than others?
￿ How should monetary policy respond to asset 
price bubbles?
￿  What other types of policy responses are 
appropriate?
My discussion of these conceptual issues is followed 
by a summary of several historical examples that 
illustrate the importance of focusing on the principles 
I have outlined.
1|  ARE SOME ASSET PRICE 
  BUBBLES MORE PROBLEMATIC 
  THAN OTHERS?
In order to consider how monetary and other policies 
should address asset price bubbles, we must ﬁ  rst 
examine how asset prices inﬂ  uence inﬂ  ation and 
aggregate economic activity. These inﬂ  uences act 
through several channels; in particular, asset prices 
provide signals regarding proﬁ  table investments, 
affect the wealth of households, and inﬂ  uence the 
cost of capital to ﬁ  rms and households. For example, 
higher equity prices, whether driven by fundamentals 
such as lower interest rates or faster productivity 
growth or by bubble-type factors like “irrational 
exuberance”, boost business investment by lowering 
the cost of capital and raise household demand by 
generating increased wealth. Other ﬂ  uctuations in 
asset prices act similarly. The resulting ﬂ  uctuations 
in resource utilisation lead to changes in inﬂ  ation.2
The inﬂ   uences of asset prices on demand 
and inﬂ   ation through traditional wealth and 
cost-of-capital channels fall directly within 
the  traditional concerns of monetary policy, a 
point to which I will return shortly. However, not 
all asset price bubbles are alike, and some bubbles 
raise issues outside the direct responsibility of 
monetary policy but within the policy concerns of 
the broader regulatory framework governing our 
ﬁ  nancial system. In particular, some asset price 
bubbles can have more-signiﬁ  cant economic effects, 
and thus raise additional concerns for economic 
policymakers, by contributing to ﬁ  nancial instability. 
Financial history reveals the following typical chain 
of events: because of either exuberant expectations 
about economic prospects or structural changes in 
ﬁ  nancial markets, a credit boom begins, increasing 
the demand for some assets and thereby raising their 
prices.3 The rise in asset values, in turn, encourages 
further lending against these assets, increasing 
demand, and hence their prices, even more. This 
feedback loop can generate a bubble, and the bubble 
1  I discuss these principles in detail in Mishkin (2007b, 2007f).
2  Of course, asset price bubbles have additional implications for economic efﬁ  ciency. Departures of asset prices from levels implied by economic fundamentals can 
lead to inappropriate investments that decrease the efﬁ  ciency of the economy by diverting resources toward economic activities that are supported by the bubble 
(for example, see Dupor, 2005). For example, during the bubble in tech stocks in the late 1990s, there was overinvestment in some types of high-tech infrastructure. 
Similarly, the bubble in housing prices led to too many houses being built. These distortions to activity across sectors of the economy are a drag on efﬁ  ciency and 
hence are a matter of concern above and beyond ﬂ  uctuations in overall economic activity and inﬂ  ation.
3  See, for example, Mishkin (1991) and Kindleberger (2000).ARTICLES
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can cause credit standards to ease as lenders become 
less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to 
repay loans and instead rely on further appreciation 
of the asset to shield themselves from losses.
At some point, however, the bubble bursts. The 
collapse in asset prices then leads to a reversal of the 
feedback loop in which loans go sour, lenders cut back 
on credit supply, the demand for the assets declines 
further, and prices drop even more. The resulting loan 
losses and declines in asset prices erode the balance 
sheets at ﬁ  nancial institutions, further diminishing 
credit and investment across a broad range of assets. 
The decline in lending depresses business and 
household spending, which weakens economic activity 
and increases macroeconomic risk in credit markets.4 
In the extreme, the interaction between asset prices 
and the health of ﬁ  nancial institutions following the 
collapse of an asset price bubble can endanger the 
operation of the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole.5
To be clear, not all asset price bubbles create these 
risks to the ﬁ  nancial system. For example, the bubble 
in technology stocks in the late 1990s was not fueled by 
a feedback loop between bank lending and rising equity 
values; indeed, the bursting of the tech-stock bubble was 
not accompanied by a marked deterioration in bank 
balance sheets. But potential for some asset price bubbles 
to create larger difﬁ  culties for the ﬁ  nancial system than 
others implies that our regulatory framework should 
be designed to address the potential challenges to the 
ﬁ  nancial system created by these bubbles.
2| H OW SHOULD MONETARY 
  POLICY RESPOND TO 
  ASSET PRICE BUBBLES?
In order to think about how central banks should 
respond to asset prices, we need to ﬁ  rst remember 
the  objectives of monetary policy. The ultimate 
purpose of a central bank should be to promote 
the public good through policies that foster economic 
prosperity. Research in monetary economics describes 
this objective in terms of stabilising both inﬂ  ation 
and economic activity. Indeed, these objectives are 
exactly what is embodied in the dual mandate that the 
Congress has given the Federal Reserve.6
Because of their effects on prices and employment, 
macroeconomic ﬂ   uctuations due to asset price 
movements are a concern for monetary policy 
makers. However, the macroeconomic consequences 
of asset price ﬂ  uctuations are unlikely to have 
long-lasting and severe consequences for the 
economy as long as monetary policy responds 
appropriately. Whether an asset price bubble is 
occurring or not, as asset prices rise and boost the 
outlook for economic activity and inﬂ  ation, monetary 
policy should respond by moving to a more restrictive 
stance. After a bubble bursts and the outlook for 
economic activity deteriorates, policy should 
become more accommodative.7 As I pointed out in a 
paper that I presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City’s Jackson Hole conference in September, 
if monetary policy responds immediately to the 
decline in asset prices, the negative effects from 
a bursting asset price bubble to economic activity 
arising from the decline in wealth and increase in 
the cost of capital to ﬁ  rms and households are likely 
to be small.8 More generally, monetary policy should 
react to asset price bubbles by looking to the effects 
of such bubbles on employment and inﬂ  ation, then 
adjusting policy as required to achieve maximum 
sustainable employment and price stability.
To be clear, I think that in most cases, monetary policy 
should not respond to asset prices per se, but rather 
to changes in the outlook for inﬂ  ation and aggregate 
demand resulting from asset price movements. This 
point of view implies that actions, such as attempting 
to “prick” an asset price bubble, should be avoided.
I take this view for (at least) three important 
reasons.9 First, asset price bubbles can be hard to 
4  I have previously discussed the interaction of ﬁ  nancial markets and macroeconomic risk (for example, Mishkin, 2007d, 2007e).
5  See my earlier remarks on the subject (Mishkin, 2007c).
6  The Federal Reserve’s congressional mandate is actually couched in terms of three goals: maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest 
rates. However, as I have discussed (Mishkin, 2007a), the mandate is more appropriately interpreted in terms of the dual goals of price stability and maximum 
sustainable employment, and this formulation is what is consistent with stabilising both inﬂ  ation and economic activity. Mishkin (2008) discusses how the pursuit 
of price stability can foster maximum sustainable employment.
7  Vice Chairman Kohn (2006) presented similar views on the response of monetary policy to asset prices.
8  See Mishkin (2007g).
9  An additional reason is that many crashes of asset prices which have become associated with asset price bubbles have had very limited affects on the economy. 
In a paper I wrote with Eugene White (Mishkin and White, 2003), we studied 15 stock market crashes that occurred in the United States from 1900 to 2001 and 
found that in most cases they were not followed by episodes of ﬁ  nancial instability.ARTICLES
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identify. As a result, tightening monetary policy to 
restrain a bubble that has been misidentiﬁ  ed can 
lead to weaker economic growth than is warranted. 
In addition, central bank actions to inﬂ  uence asset 
prices when the central bank is uncertain about the 
presence or extent of a bubble can interfere with the 
role of asset prices in allocating resources.10
Second, even if asset price bubbles could be identiﬁ  ed, 
the effect of interest rates on asset price bubbles is 
highly uncertain. Although some theoretical models 
suggest that raising interest rates can diminish the 
acceleration of asset prices, raising interest rates may 
be very ineffective in restraining the bubble, because 
market participants expect such high rates of return 
from buying bubble-driven assets.11 Other research and 
historical examples (which I will discuss later) have 
suggested that raising interest rates may cause a bubble 
to burst more severely, thereby increasing the damage 
to the economy.12 Another way of saying this is that 
bubbles are departures from normal behaviour, and it 
is unrealistic to expect that the usual tools of monetary 
policy will be effective in abnormal conditions. 
The bottom line is that we do not know the effects of 
monetary policy actions on asset price bubbles.
Third, there are many asset prices, and at any one 
time a bubble may be present in only a fraction of 
assets. Monetary policy actions are a very blunt 
instrument in such a case, as such actions would be 
likely to affect asset prices in general, rather than 
solely those in a bubble.
All told, research suggests that monetary policy that 
does not try to prick bubbles, but instead responds 
solely to the inﬂ   ation and aggregate demand 
outlook, is likely to lead to better outcomes even 
when bubbles might arise.13
3| ARE OTHER TYPES OF POLICY 
  RESPONSES APPROPRIATE?
I would now like to return to the effect of asset price 
bubbles on the stability of the ﬁ  nancial  system. 
As I highlighted earlier, some, but clearly not all, asset 
price bubbles create risks to the ﬁ  nancial system that 
could have large negative effects on the macroeconomy. 
As a result, it is important to examine the potential 
for government policies to address the type of bubble 
in which there is feedback between asset prices and 
ﬁ   nancial stability. I would like to emphasise the 
importance of regulatory policy. Monetary policy –that 
is, the setting of overnight interest rates– is already 
challenged by the task of managing both price stability 
and maximum sustainable employment. As a result, 
it falls to regulatory policies and supervisory practices 
to help strengthen the ﬁ  nancial system and reduce its 
vulnerability to both booms and busts in asset prices.
Of course, some aspects of such policies are simply 
the usual elements of a well-functioning prudential 
regulatory and supervisory system. These elements 
include adequate disclosure and capital requirements, 
prompt corrective action, careful monitoring of an 
institution’s risk-management procedures, close 
supervision of ﬁ   nancial institutions to enforce 
compliance with regulations, and sufﬁ  cient resources 
and accountability for supervisors.
More generally, our approach to regulation should 
favor policies that will help prevent future feedback 
loops between asset price bubbles and credit supply. 
A few broad principles are helpful in thinking about 
what such policies should look like. First, regulations 
should be designed with an eye toward ﬁ  xing market 
failures. Second, regulations should be designed so 
as not to exacerbate the interaction between asset 
price bubbles and credit provision. For example, 
research has shown that the rise in asset values that 
accompanies a boom results in higher capital buffers 
at ﬁ  nancial institutions, supporting further lending in 
the context of an unchanging benchmark for capital 
adequacy; in the bust, the value of this capital can 
drop precipitously, possibly even necessitating a cut 
in lending.14 It is important for research to continue 
to analyse the role of bank capital requirements in 
promoting ﬁ   nancial stability, including whether 
capital requirements should be adjusted over 
the business cycle or whether other changes in 
our regulatory structure are necessary to ensure 
macroeconomic efﬁ  ciency.15 Finally, in general, 
10  Chairman Bernanke (2002) has discussed this potential problem.
11  For example, see the discussion in Greenspan (2002).
12  For example, see Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005).
13  Research supporting this view includes Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Bernanke and Gertler (2001); and Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2005).
14  For example, see Kashyap and Stein (2004) and Goodhart (2008).
15  Research to date has not reached unambiguous conclusions. See Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2005); Kashyap and Stein (2004); and Gordy and Howells (2006) 
for a more thorough discussion of related issues.ARTICLES
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regulatory policies are appropriately focused on the 
soundness of individual institutions. However, during 
certain periods, risks across institutions become 
highly correlated, and we need to consider whether 
such policies might need to take account of these 
higher-stress environments in assessing the resilience 
of both individual institutions and the ﬁ  nancial system 
as a whole in the face of potential external shocks.
Some policies to address the risks to ﬁ  nancial 
stability from asset price bubbles could be made a 
standard part of the regulatory system and would 
be operational at all times –whether a bubble was in 
progress or not. However, because speciﬁ  c or new 
types of market failures might be driving a particular 
asset price bubble, some future bubbles will almost 
certainly create unanticipated difﬁ  culties, and, as 
a result, adjustments to our policy stance to limit 
the market failure contributing to a bubble could be 
very beneﬁ  cial if identiﬁ  ed and implemented at the 
appropriate time.
Earlier, I pointed out that a bubble could be hard 
to identify. Indeed, I think this is especially true 
of bubbles in the stock market. Central banks 
or government ofﬁ   cials are unlikely to have an 
informational advantage over market participants. 
If a central bank were able to identify bubbles in the 
stock market, wouldn’t market participants be able to 
do so as well? If so, then a bubble would be unlikely to 
develop, because market participants would know that 
prices were getting out of line with fundamentals.
However, although I believe that stock market bubbles 
might be hard to identify because they are typically 
not driven by credit booms (which also makes them 
less harmful because their collapse is less likely to 
lead to ﬁ  nancial instability), when asset prices are 
rising rapidly at the same time that credit is booming, 
there may be a greater likelihood that asset prices are 
deviating from fundamentals, because laxer credit 
standards may be driving asset prices upward.16 In 
this case, ﬁ  nancial regulators at central banks and 
other institutions may have a greater likelihood of 
identifying that a bubble is in progress; for example, 
they might have information that lenders have 
weakened their underwriting standards and that 
credit extension is rising at abnormally high rates.
The reasoning here suggests that a rapid rise in 
asset prices accompanied by a credit boom provides 
a signal that should lead central bankers and other 
ﬁ  nancial supervisors to carefully scrutinise ﬁ  nancial 
developments to see if market failures might be 
driving the asset price boom. The resulting analysis of 
ﬁ  nancial developments might then lead policymakers 
to consider implementing policies to address the 
imperfections behind the market failures and thereby 
help reduce the magnitude of the bubble.
4| S OME HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
I would like to now turn to a few examples from
US history and international experience that
highlight the interaction between asset price bubbles, 
ﬁ  nancial stability, and the policy framework.
4|1  The stock market boom 
  of the 1920s
The Roaring Twenties and the onset of the 
Great  Depression present a particularly drastic 
example. The US economy thrived during the 
1920s as new technologies, ﬁ  nancial innovations, 
and improved business practices were introduced 
and contributed to a general sense of optimism. 
The stock market experienced a dramatic rise during 
that decade until it burst during the Great Crash 
of 1929.
A popular account of that period attributes the stock 
market boom to easy credit and rising speculation; 
the period ended with panic selling on Wall Street 
and triggered the beginning of the Great Depression.17 
According to this view, the Federal Reserve was 
incorrect in letting the rise in equity prices develop and 
should have raised interest rates to stem stock market 
speculation. You will guess from my proposed set of 
principles for monetary policy that I view this approach 
as mistaken.
It is ﬁ  rst very difﬁ  cult to assess the extent to which 
the stock market was driven by nonfundamental 
16  Stock market bubbles can do more harm if stocks are held by ﬁ  nancial institutions and these institutions are allowed to include the market value of stocks in their 
capital base. As described later, this practice was a feature of the Japanese bank regulatory system and is one reason why the collapse of the stock market bubble 
in Japan helped lead to fragility of the banking system and, as a result, was much more damaging to the economy.
17  See, among others, Galbraith (1954) and Kindleberger (2000).ARTICLES
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forces at the time; by some accounts, the stock market 
bubble started only in March 1928.18 Nonetheless, 
the rise in equity prices took a more prominent 
place during policy discussions at the Fed beginning 
in 1927, with Board member Adolph Miller pressing 
fervently for an increase in interest rates to stop the 
speculative use of credit. This approach was opposed 
by Benjamin Strong, the inﬂ  uential Governor of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York who feared 
a negative impact on the economy: “…any effort 
through higher rates directed especially at stock 
speculation would have an unfavorable effect upon 
business…”.19 However, Strong’s death in 1928 opened 
the door for a more restrictive monetary policy aimed 
at curbing excesses in the stock market, even as signs 
of economic weakness became visible.
The tightening cycle that ended in August 1929 
weakened an already deteriorating economy and 
paved the way for the collapse of the stock market 
in  October. The Federal Reserve’s mistake 
in attempting to burst the bubble directly was made 
worse by its refusal to change course rapidly after the 
market collapsed and the banking system got into 
trouble. Persisting too long with a tight monetary 
policy stance allowed deﬂ  ation to set in, which 
raised real interest rates to extremely high levels 
and further depressed growth.
4|2  Japan’s asset price boom 
  and the Lost Decade
An asset price bubble also confronted the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) with tough decisions starting in the 
mid- to late 1980s. The extent of the asset price boom 
in Japan in the late 1980s can be gauged by the 
fact that the land surrounding the Imperial Palace 
in  Tokyo was estimated to be worth more than 
the whole of California at that time. Without a doubt, 
the 1980s was a prosperous decade in Japan with 
high growth, low unemployment, little inﬂ  ation, 
and an envied business model. During that decade, 
equity prices rose more than 600 percent and land 
prices boomed more than 400 percent.
Soaring equity and land prices during the 1980s, 
combined with relatively low interest rates, eased 
ﬁ  nancing conditions for investment substantially.20 
The ratio of bank loans to gross domestic product 
surged, and investment spending became the 
main driver of economic activity. Because of 
ﬁ  nancial deregulation, banks’ risk-taking behaviour 
also increased as they channeled more funds to 
real-estate-related sectors and to small ﬁ  rms, accepting 
property as collateral.21 Trusting in a rising real estate 
market, some banks went as far as lending more than 
100 percent of a property’s appraisal value.
As at the Fed during the Roaring Twenties, the BOJ 
was concerned about the rapid rise in asset prices 
in the mid-1980s and the possibility that a bubble 
was in progress. In 1989, as asset prices continued to 
soar and inﬂ  ation moved upward, the BOJ decided 
to start raising rates. The stock market collapsed at 
the beginning of 1990, but land prices continued to 
rise, and the BOJ kept tightening policy. Monetary 
policy only gradually reversed course in the summer 
of 1991 as growth declined and inﬂ  ation and land 
prices started to move down. The subsequent decade 
has been termed “the Lost Decade”. During that time, 
Japan suffered from anemic growth and repeated 
bouts of very low inﬂ  ation and deﬂ  ation.
Japan’s experience re-emphasises the importance of 
regulatory policies that may prevent feedback loops 
between asset price bubbles and credit provision. 
Indeed, during the boom, Japanese regulations that 
allowed banks to take large leveraged positions in 
equities and to count as capital unrealised gains 
may have contributed to banks’ appetite for equities 
during the stock market run-up and to ﬁ  nancial 
instability as the stock market collapsed.
After the bursting of the bubble, policymakers 
did not quickly resolve the fragility of the banking 
sector, thereby allowing conditions to worsen as 
banks kept lending to inefﬁ  cient,  debt-ridden, 
so-called zombie ﬁ  rms.
On the other hand, Japan’s experience does not 
support the need for preemptive monetary policy 
18  See, for instance, Galbraith (1954) and White (1990).
19  See Meltzer (2003, p. 225).
20  The stance of monetary policy was relatively easy during the mid-1980s as the BOJ attempted to contain the rapid appreciation of the yen following the Plaza Accord 
of 1985 and stimulated domestic demand to correct external imbalances.
21  Corporate restrictions on funding in the securities market were lifted in the 1980s, which reduced large ﬁ  rms’ reliance on banks’ loans. Moreover, interest rate ceilings 
on bank deposits were also gradually removed. See Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001).ARTICLES
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actions to deﬂ  ate a bubble, as some commentators 
have suggested.22 The tightening of monetary policy 
during the bubble period does not appear to have 
led to better economic outcomes. Moreover, the BOJ 
did not reverse course sufﬁ  ciently or rapidly enough 
in the aftermath of the crisis.23 Research suggests 
that it was the slow response of monetary policy to 
the deterioration in the economic outlook and fall 
in inﬂ  ation following the bursting of the bubble that 
contributed to the onset of deﬂ  ation.24
4|3  The recent US experience
As highlighted in my introduction, the issues 
I have discussed here are especially salient because 
of the recent experience with house prices in the 
United States. It is too early to draw ﬁ  rm conclusions 
regarding all of the factors that have contributed to 
the rise and decline of house prices and the impact 
of these developments on our ﬁ  nancial system and 
the macroeconomy. But the Federal Reserve and 
other government agencies have already begun to 
address some weaknesses that emerged during this 
period. For example, problems arose in recent years 
in the chain linking the origination of mortgages 
to their distribution to investors through structured 
investment products like mortgage-backed securities. 
Underwriting standards became increasingly 
compromised at origination. In retrospect, the 
breakdown in underwriting can be linked to the 
incentives that the originate-to-distribute model, as 
implemented in this case, created for the originators. 
Notably, the incentive structures often tied 
originator revenue to loan volume rather than to the 
quality of the loans being passed up the chain. This 
problem was exacerbated by the bubble in house 
prices: lenders began to ease standards as further 
appreciation in house prices was expected to ensure 
that risk was low, and investors failed to perform 
the research necessary to fully appreciate the risks 
in their investments, instead relying on further 
house price appreciation to prevent losses. The 
interaction between lenders’ and investors’ views 
and house prices illustrates the pernicious feedback 
loop I highlighted earlier.
These problems became apparent only in 
retrospect, in part, because the growth of the 
originate-to-distribute model for mortgages was an 
ongoing innovation in ﬁ  nancial markets; as a result, 
neither the market nor regulators had sufﬁ  cient 
information for evaluating the nature of the risks 
involved. Looking forward, efforts to improve 
scrutiny of the processes that originators use and the 
incentives they face, better information for consumers, 
improved performance of the credit rating agencies, 
and a number of other reforms that have been 
recommended by the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets will be important in preventing a 
future bubble like that in the most recent experience 
–steps highlighted by Chairman Bernanke in remarks 
earlier this year.25
22  Posen (2003) provides an extended discussion of the reasons why such a reading of the Japanese experience is mistaken.
23  For example, see Ahearne et alii (2002) and Posen (2003).
24  See Ito and Mishkin (2006). The slowness with which the imbalances in Japan’s banking sector were addressed was another important factor leading to the 
deterioration in the economic outlook and deﬂ  ation after the bubble burst.
25  The speech by Chairman Bernanke on April 10, 2008 provides a more detailed description of the market and regulatory failures during this period and the 
recommendations of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.ARTICLES
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Let me conclude by reiterating the main points of the analysis here. First, not all asset price bubbles are 
alike. Asset price bubbles that are associated with credit booms present particular challenges, because 
their bursting can lead to episodes of ﬁ  nancial instability that have damaging effects on the economy.
Second, monetary policy should not try to prick possible asset price bubbles, even when they are of the 
variety that can contribute to ﬁ  nancial instability. Just as doctors take the Hippocratic oath to do no harm, 
central banks should recognise that trying to prick asset price bubbles using monetary policy is likely 
to do more harm than good. Instead, monetary policy should react to asset price bubbles by looking to the 
effects of asset prices on employment and inﬂ  ation, then adjusting policy as required to achieve maximum 
sustainable employment and price stability. This monetary policy response should prove sufﬁ  cient to prevent 
adverse macroeconomic effects of some types of asset price bubbles.
Third, because asset price bubbles can arise from market failures that lead to credit booms, regulation can help 
prevent feedback loops between asset price bubbles and credit provision. Our regulatory framework should 
be structured to address failures in information or market incentives that contribute to credit-driven bubbles. 
Moreover, we should aim to monitor the health of the ﬁ  nancial system overall and ensure that our regulatory 
approach takes account of risks across institutions that are highly correlated and thus affect the strength of 
the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole.
We have learned many lessons from past experience in the United States and in other countries, and I am 
conﬁ  dent that continued research in these areas will help us address the new tests that will undoubtedly 
arise as ﬁ  nancial innovation and the evolving structure of our ﬁ  nancial markets present new challenges. ARTICLES
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